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VIOLENTLY POSSESSED: JOHNSON 
AS THE VEHICLE FOR LIMITING 
SENTENCING ENHANCEMENT 




As a curative measure for indeterminacy in sentencing, 
legislatures, and particularly the United States Congress, have often 
imposed mandatory minimum sentencing, including sentence 
enhancement, for certain crimes.1 At the federal level these sentencing 
regimes date back to the early days of the republic but have only 
gained significant attention over the past several decades.2 There are 
currently nearly two-hundred federal offenses that come with 
mandatory minimum prison sentences (many of them added in the 
past couple of decades),3 though not all are enforced to the same 
degree.4 And many academics and practitioners have challenged the 
efficacy of such regimes.5 Criticism of mandatory minimum sentencing 
regimes has become increasingly widespread.6 For example, Justice 
Breyer, who served previously as United States Sentencing 
 
 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2016. 
 1.  See, e.g., SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 1167 (9th ed. 2012). 
 2.  Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
199, 200 (1993). 
 3.  See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM 
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 72 (2011). 
 4.  See Schulhofer, supra note 2, at 201.  
 5.  See, e.g., id. at 220–21 (concluding that mandatory minimums often lead to excessive 
punishment without eliminating uncertainty, create the potential for abuse, and lower 
accountability in sentencing). 
 6.  See Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 
(2010) (noting that the belief that mandatory minimums “depriv[e] judges of the flexibility to 
tailor punishment . . . and can result in an unduly harsh sentence” has spread beyond the 
judiciary to the political branches). 
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Commissioner, has argued that statutory mandatory minimum 
sentencing hampers the determination of appropriate sentences and 
allows prosecutors to subvert the judicial role in the sentencing 
proces.7 This view has also gained currency with the general public.8 
The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) of 1984 is an example 
of statutorily defined mandatory minimum sentences, imposing 
sentencing enhancements for firearm offenses committed by persons 
with a prior history of violent crime.9 The ACCA allows for sentencing 
enhancement if a defendant has prior convictions meeting the 
statute’s definition of a “violent felony.”10 Importantly, the ACCA 
contains a so-called “residual clause” providing that a prior conviction 
counts as a violent felony for purposes of sentencing enhancement if 
it “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another.”11 
As the Supreme Court found in 1990, the principal aim of the 
ACCA is to “supplement the States’ law enforcement efforts against 
‘career’ criminals.”12 The legislative rationale was that particular care 
needed to be taken with regard to repeat offenders, given evidence 
that such offenders were responsible for a “large percentage” of 
violent crimes.13 The legislature’s motivation was to “incapacitate” 
such criminals.14 
Because of the complexity (or perhaps the opacity)15 of the 
ACCA’s residual clause, it has been the subject of a remarkable 
amount of litigation in the federal courts.16 There is currently a circuit 
split over the question presented in Johnson v. United States,17 namely 
 
 7.  Hon. Stephen Breyer, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Revisited, 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 
180 (1999). 
 8.  See, e.g., Leon Neyfakh, Can juries tame prosecutors gone wild?, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 
3, 2013, http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2013/02/03/can-juries-tame-prosecutors-gone-wild-
can-juries-tame-prosecutors-gone-wild/yAvVOZPmpm408lskfiMe3M/story.html. 
 9.  See 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e) (West 2014).  
 10.  The three definitions of violent felony are discussed infra Part III. 
 11.  18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 
 12.  Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 581 (1990). 
 13.  See H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 1 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3661. 
 14.  Id. at 2. 
 15.  See Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2284 (2011) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (Justice 
Scalia has termed it the “Delphic residual clause”). 
 16.  See United States v. Miller, 721 F.3d 435, 437 (7th Cir. 2013) (remarking that 
“[p]erhaps no single statutory clause has ever received more frequent Supreme Court attention 
in such a short period of time or such a proliferation of lower court reaction”). 
 17.  No. 13-7120 (U.S. argued Nov. 5, 2014). 
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whether mere possession of a short-barreled shotgun is a violent 
felony under the ACCA.18 Four circuits answer in the negative and 
two in the affirmative.19 Thus, Johnson presents the Court not only an 
opportunity to resolve a circuit split but also to provide much needed 
clarity to its jurisprudence regarding the ACCA residual clause. 
This commentary details the relevant facts and procedural history, 
including the Eighth Circuit’s holding below, and overviews current 
ACCA residual clause jurisprudence. It then lays out the arguments 
advanced by both parties and analyzes these arguments in light of the 
governing law, concluding that the Court should reverse the Eighth 
Circuit and resolve the existing circuit split by interpreting the 
residual clause of the ACCA so as not to encompass mere possession 
offenses. This commentary offers a way for the Court to structure its 
holding narrowly to cover constructive possession cases only. Doing 
so will still allow application of ACCA sentence enhancements when 
appropriate. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The issue in Johnson v. United States centers squarely upon the 
ACCA residual clause: whether mere possession of short-barreled 
shotgun constitutes “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another.”20 From 2010 to 2012, the FBI investigated 
the Petitioner, Samuel Johnson, in connection with his involvement in 
several illicit activities.21 During the investigation, Johnson divulged to 
undercover federal agents that he had manufactured explosives and 
displayed both an AK-47 assault rifle and a cache of ammunition in 
excess of one thousand rounds.22 Later, Johnson was found in 
possession of several semi-automatic firearms; when arrested in April 




 18.  See Brief for Petitioner at 42–47, Johnson v. United States, No. 13-7120 (U.S. Jun. 26, 
2014) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]. 
 19.  The circuit split is discussed infra Part III. 
 20.  18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (West 2014). 
 21.  See United States v. Johnson, 526 Fed. Appx. 708, 709 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. granted 134 
S. Ct. 1871 (2014). 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
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Subsequently, Johnson was charged with four counts of possession 
of a firearm by a convicted felon and two counts of possession of 
ammunition by a convicted felon, all violations of 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(1).24 While the penalty for such offenses is ordinarily a prison 
term not exceeding ten years,25 Johnson faced a potential mandatory 
minimum sentence of fifteen years because he was also charged with 
being an armed career criminal in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), 
because of his three prior violent-felony convictions.26 
A presentence investigation report (PSR) classified three of 
Johnson’s prior convictions as “violent felonies” for purposes of 
establishing the requisite number of predicate offenses under the 
ACCA: a 1999 attempted simple robbery conviction; a 2007 simple 
robbery conviction; and a 2007 conviction for possession of a short-
barreled shotgun during a drug sale.27 Over Johnson’s objection, the 
district court followed the recommendation of the PSR and found 
that Johnson was subject to sentence enhancement under the 
ACCA.28 The basis for the third predicate offense for Johnson’s 
classification as an “armed career criminal” was his conviction under a 
 
 24.  See generally Indictment, United States v. Johnson, No. 12-0104 (D. Minn. April 16, 
2012) [hereinafter Indictment]. The statute prohibits, in relevant part, a person “who has been 
convicted in any court, of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . 
to possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(1). 
 25.  See 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(a)(2) (“[W]hoever knowingly violates [§ 922(g)] . . . shall be 
fined as provided in this title, imprisoned not more than ten years or both.”). 
 26.  See generally Indictment, supra note 24. The Indictment listed Johnson’s five prior 
convictions, including convictions for felony theft, attempted simple robbery, simple robbery, 
possession of a short-barreled shotgun, and sale of a simulated controlled substance. Id. Under 
the ACCA, a person who violates § 922(g) and who also has three prior convictions for “violent 
felon[ies]” is subject to a punishment of a fine and a mandatory minimum prison sentence of 
fifteen years. 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e) (defining a “violent felony” to be a “crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . [which] (i) has as an element the use, attempted 
use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, 
or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious 
potential risk of physical injury to another”). 
 27.  See Johnson, 526 Fed. Appx. at 709. 
 28.  Id. at 710. The district court made clear that its decision to classify Johnson as an 
armed career criminal, and therefore subject to an enhanced sentence, was mandated by Eighth 
Circuit precedent. During the sentencing hearing, the court observed: 
For whatever it’s worth, and it’s probably worth nothing, I think 180 months is too 
heavy of a sentence in this case. But I take an oath to follow the law as I see it and I’ve 
made my decision in that regard. But, as I say, I impose the sentence reluctantly 
because I think a sentence of half that or two-thirds of that would be more than 
sufficient. 
Transcript of Sentence Hearing at 22, United States v. Johnson, No. 12-0104 (D. Minn. Sept. 5, 
2012). 
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Minnesota statute prohibiting a person from “possess[ing] . . . [a] 
short-barreled shotgun.”29 
Johnson subsequently pleaded guilty to one count of being an 
armed career criminal in possession of a firearm in violation of § 
922(g)(1).30 Following his guilty plea, the remaining five counts were 
dismissed, and Johnson was given a prison sentence of fifteen years.31 
As part of the plea agreement, Johnson agreed to his designation as 
an armed career criminal, but he reserved the right to challenge the 
application of the ACCA.32 
Significantly, the Eighth Circuit noted that the factual situation at 
issue in Johnson is indistinguishable from that in United States v. 
Lillard,33 which dealt with the constructive possession of a short 
shotgun under a Nebraska statute comparable to the Minnesota 
statute.34 Thus, the court held that mere possession of a short-barreled 
shotgun constitutes a violent felony for purposes of sentence 
enhancement under the ACCA.35 Johnson petitioned for a writ of 
certiorari to the Supreme Court,36 granted on April 21, 2014.37 
Johnson’s case was argued on November 5, 2014 but the Court later 
reopened the case in January 2015, requesting further briefing and 
oral argument on the question of whether the ACCA is 
unconstitutionally vague.38 
 
 29.  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.67(2) (West 2014). The statute provides that a violation is 
punishable by a prison term of five years or a fine of not more than $10,000 or both. Id. Johnson 
is only contesting the designation of this third offense as a violent felony; he is not challenging 
the classification of either attempted robbery or simple robbery as violent felonies. See Brief for 
Petitioner, supra note 18, at 4. 
 30.  See Johnson, 526 Fed. Appx. at 709. 
 31.  Id. at 710. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  United States v. Lillard, 685 F.3d 773 (8th Cir. 2012), discussed infra Part II. 
 34.  Id. at 776 n.3. The Nebraska statute in Lillard provided that “[a]ny person or persons 
who shall transport or possess any machine gun, short rifle, or short shotgun commits a Class IV 
felony.” NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1203(1) (West 2014). 
 35.  Johnson, 526 Fed. Appx. at 711. 
 36.  Brief of Petitioner in Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit at 8, Johnson v. United States, No. 13-7120 (U.S. Oct. 28, 2013). 
 37.  Johnson v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1871 (2014) (granting certiorari).  
 38.  See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 939 (2015) (directing parties to file briefs and 
rescheduling argument on the question of unconstitutional vagueness). 
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II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  The Statutory Language of § 924(e) 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), there are three distinct ways in which a 
predicate offense, punishable by a prison term in excess of one year, 
can constitute a violent felony for purposes of sentencing 
enhancement.39 First, a crime that “has as an element the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person 
of another” is considered a violent felony.40 Second, the statute 
explicitly lists burglary, arson, extortion, or the use of explosives as 
crimes meeting the definition of violent felony.41 Finally, under the 
residual clause at issue here, any offense that “otherwise involves 
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another” also qualifies as a violent felony.42 Those persons convicted 
under § 922(g) and subject to § 924(e) recieve a minimum sentence of 
fifteen years.43 
B.  The Supreme Court’s § 924(e) Residual Clause Jurisprudence 
The Court has adopted a “categorical approach” to the residual 
clause, holding that a sentencing court must “look only to the fact that 
the defendant had been convicted of crimes falling within certain 
categories, and not to the facts underlying the prior convictions.”44 In 
applying this approach, the Court has further held that judicial 
inquiry should be restricted to the “least of [the] acts” required to 





 39.  See generally 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e) (West 2014). 
 40.  Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). 
 41.  See id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 
 42.  18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 
 43.  Id. § 924(e)(1). 
 44.  Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990) (holding that a conviction for an 
offense requiring proof of all elements of burglary constituted burglary under the residual 
clause regardless of how the offense was labeled). 
 45.  Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 137 (2010). A more recent case, dealing with 
the Immigration and Naturalization Act rather than the ACCA, further explicated the 
categorical approach given in Taylor by requiring a “focus on the minimum conduct 
criminalized” under a state statute without resorting to “legal imagination.” Moncrieffe v. 
Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684–85 (2013). 
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In four prior cases, the Supreme Court has described this 
categorical approach as a test that “consider[s] whether the elements 
of the offense are of the type that would justify its inclusion within the 
residual provision” by “ask[ing] whether the risk posed . . . is 
comparable to that posed by its closest analog among the enumerated 
offenses.”46 Risk is assessed in terms of “the possibility that an 
innocent person might appear while the crime is in progress.”47 Those 
offenses falling within the scope of the residual clause are those 
“similar” to the enumerated offenses in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).48 An 
offense must be “roughly similar,” in both kind and degree of risk.49 
The Court has also adopted a “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” 
conduct test for determining whether an offense qualifies as a violent 
felony.50 However, this test is not always necessary in a residual clause 
analysis.51 In some cases, the analysis under this test folds into the 
“risk” inquiry because offenses that would fall within the class of 
“purposeful, violent, and aggressive” conduct would also be “those 
that present serious potential risks of physical injury to others.”52 In 
these cases, only a risk assessment is required because “risk levels 
provide a categorical and manageable standard.”53 In assessing risk, 
the question is that formulated in James v. United States, namely a 
comparison of risk to the closest analog in the enumerated offenses.54 
Nonetheless, the “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” conduct test 
remains appropriate for offenses with a required mental state of less 
than intentionality.55 
 
 46.  James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 202–03 (2007). 
 47.  Id. at 203. 
 48.  The enumerated offenses are burglary, arson, extortion, and the use of explosives. See 
18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). See also Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 143–44 (2008) 
(rejecting the claim that the word “otherwise” in the residual clause meant that the enumerated 
offenses in no way limited the scope of the residual clause). 
 49.  Begay, 553 U.S. at 143–44. 
 50.  See id. at 144–45 (recognizing that the enumerated crimes “all typically involve 
purposeful, ‘violent,’ and ‘aggressive’ conduct”). The Court has ruled that an offense which 
“amounts to a form of inaction [is] a far cry” from that conduct which would satisfy this test as a 
violent felony. Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 128 (2009). 
 51.  See Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2275 (2011) (observing that the phrase from 
Begay “‘purposeful, violent, and aggressive’ has no precise textual link to the residual clause” 
and is “an addition to the statutory text”). 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. at 2275–76. 
 54.  Id. at 2273 (quoting James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 203 (2007)). 
 55.  Id. at 2276. Thus, Sykes did not overrule Begay or Chambers, but merely noted that the 
rules from those cases are not necessarily applicable in all cases dealing with the residual clause. 
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C.  The Circuit Split on “Mere Possession” of Short-barreled Shotguns 
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed whether 
possession of a short-barreled (or sawed-off) shotgun is a violent 
felony under § 924(e), several circuit courts of appeals, employing 
current residual clause jurisprudence, have. The Sixth,56 Eleventh,57 
and Seventh58 Circuits have all ruled that possession of a short-
barreled shotgun is not a violent felony under § 924(e). The Fourth 
Circuit, in two unpublished opinions, has also answered that question 
negatively.59 
The Sixth Circuit has held that mere possession of a sawed-off 
shotgun is not a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA because 
possession does not “fit well with the more active crimes” listed in § 
924(e)(ii).60 The Eleventh Circuit agreed, noting that while both short-
barreled shotguns and explosives are treated equivalently under the 
National Firearms Act (NFA),61 the ACCA includes only “use of 
explosives” in the enumerated offenses and does not include 
possession offenses.62 The Eleventh Circuit therefore held that it 
would be incongruous to “classify possessing one type of NFA-
outlawed weapon as a violent felony when the ACCA speaks only to 
the use of another.”63 The Seventh Circuit also held that mere 
possession of a short-barreled shotgun is not a violent felony because 
such possession, in terms of the risk, “is not in the same league as the 
risks presented by the offenses of burglary, arson, extortion, or crimes 
involving the use of explosives.”64 In so holding, the Seventh Circuit 
expressly rejected the approach adopted by the Eighth Circuit, 
discussed infra, by positing that the “latent risks inherent in . . . 
 
 56.  United States v. Amos, 501 F.3d 525, 529 (6th Cir. 2007). The Sixth Circuit reached its 
decision in Amos prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Begay. 
 57.  United States v. McGill, 618 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 58.  United States v. Miller, 721 F.3d 435, 437 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 59.  United States v. Ross, 416 Fed. Appx. 289, 290 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Haste, 
292 Fed. Appx. 249, 250 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 60.  Amos, 501 F.3d at 528. 
 61.  National Firearms Act of 1934, June 26, 1934, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236, amended by the 
National Firearms Act Amendments of 1968, Pub. L. 90-618, Title II, Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 1227 
(codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.A. (West 2014)). Under the NFA, it is a criminal 
offense to possess a firearm made or transferred in violation of the NFA, see 26 U.S.C.A. § 
5861(b)–(d) (West 2014), punishable by a fine of up to $10,000, a prison term of not more than 
ten years, or both, see 28 U.S.C.A. § 5871 (West 2014). 
 62.  McGill, 618 F.3d at 1279. 
 63.  Id.  
 64.  United States v. Miller, 721 F.3d 435, 439–40 (7th Cir. 2013). 
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possessing a short-barreled shotgun” do not reach the level of risk 
inherent in those enumerated offenses because mere possession of a 
firearm requires an “extra step . . . to manifest” the risk of physical 
injury to another.65 
In contrast, the First66 and Eighth67 Circuits have held that 
possession of a short-barreled shotgun is a violent felony under § 
924(e). Underlying the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion was the “inheren[t] 
dange[r] and lack [of] usefulness except for violent and criminal 
purposes” of short-barreled shotguns.68 The court reasoned that 
because short-barreled shotguns have no lawful purpose, possession 
of such a firearm “creates a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
others” and is thus similar in kind to the enumerated offenses in § 
924(e).69 With Johnson, the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed its prior 
holdings, noting that the situation at issue here is not materially 
different from that in United States v. Lillard, where the court held 
that mere possession of a short-barreled shotgun constitutes a violent 
felony.70 
D.  Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine 
It is well-established as a matter of criminal constitutional law that 
a penal statute violates due process if it “either forbids or requires the 
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.”71 
 
 65.  Id. at 443. Miller is therefore consistent with the holding of United States v. Archer, 531 
F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 2008) (concealed carry of a weapon is not a violent felony). 
 66.  United States v. Bishop, 453 F.3d 30, 31 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Fortes, 141 
F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1998). Both of the First Circuit cases predate the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Begay. Interestingly enough, however, the First Circuit initially held, prior to Fortes, that 
possession of a firearm by a felon was not a violent felony under the ACCA in an opinion 
authored by then-Chief Judge Breyer. See United States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221, 222 (1st Cir. 
1992). 
 67.  United States v. Lillard, 685 F.3d 773, 777 (8th Cir. 2012), cert. denied 133 S. Ct. 1242 
(2013); United States v. Vincent, 575 F.3d 820, 826–27 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. denied 560 U.S. 927 
(2010). 
 68.  Vincent, 575 F.3d at 825 (quoting United States v. Childs, 403 F.3d 970, 971 (8th Cir. 
2005)). Similarly, Lillard embraced the conclusion that “[s]hort shotguns are inherently 
dangerous because they are not useful” for lawful purposes. Lillard, 658 F.3d at 776.  
 69.  Vincent, 575 F.3d at 825–26. The dissent in Vincent took issue with this conclusion, 
stating that “simple possession of a sawed-off shotgun itself does not involve violent and 
aggressive conduct in the manner of burglary, arson, extortion, or criminal use of explosives” 
and to hold otherwise “risks expanding the ACCA’s residual clause to include any crime that 
has a hypothetical connection to violence.” Id. 575 F.3d at 831 (Gruender, J., dissenting). 
 70.  United States v. Johnson, 526 Fed. Appx. 708, 711 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 71.  Connelly v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). This principle, commonly 
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The rationale for this rule is two-fold: it ensures that the public is 
provided with actual notice as to what conduct is criminally 
proscribed and it prevents arbitrary enforcement of the criminal 
laws.72 Under this doctrine, the analysis goes “not [to] the possibility 
that it will sometimes be difficult to determine whether the 
incriminating fact it establishes has been proved . . . but rather [to] the 
indeterminacy of precisely what that fact is.”73 A criminal statute fails 
the notice purpose when it fails to delineate unlawful criminal 
conduct from lawful acts or does not provide objective criteria for 
making such a determination.74 A criminal statute fails the non-
arbitrary enforcement purpose if it “vests virtually complete 
discretion” in law enforcement for deciding if a criminal suspect has 
engaged in criminal behavior.75  
A facial challenge that a law is unconstitutionally vague must 
allege that all applications of that law are invalid; and a court will 
uphold such a challenge if the law “reaches a substantial amount of 
constitutionally protected conduct.”76 However, a court ruling on a 
vagueness challenge must first determine whether there is a 
reasonable saving construction of the statutory language.77 In as 
applied challenges, however, because the standard of certainty for 
criminal statutes is relatively high, such a law may fail on vagueness 
grounds even if it is possible there may be some valid application of 
the law.78 
 
referred to as “void-for-vagueness” doctrine, is not without its critics. A popular criminal law 
casebook, with all the irony it can muster, notes that “[t]he case law that determines when 
statutes are too vague is itself exceedingly vague.” KADISH ET AL., supra note 1 at 185. Cf. 
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 524 (1948) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting) (“[I]ndefiniteness’ is 
not a quantitative concept. . . . It is itself an indefinite concept.”); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., 
Legality, Vagueness and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 196 (1985) (“The 
difficulty is that there is no yardstick of impermissible indeterminacy.”). 
 72.  Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983). Of these two purposes, the prevention 
of arbitrary enforcement predominates. See id. 
 73.  United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 306 (2008). 
 74.  See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 149 (2007). 
 75.  Kolendar, 461 U.S. at 358. 
 76.  Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982). 
 77.  Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 405 (2010) (citations omitted). 
 78.  Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 n.8. 
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III.  ARGUMENTS 
A.   Johnson’s Arguments 
Johnson first argues that mere possession of a short-barreled 
shotgun cannot constitute a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA 
because mere possession differs in kind from the enumerated offenses 
listed in § 924(e)(ii).79 He contends that possession of a short-barreled 
shotgun is a strict-liability offense under Minnesota law involving no 
purposeful, violent or aggressive conduct.80 Additionally, possession is 
not even illegal in a majority of states whereas the enumerated 
offenses listed in the ACCA are universally regarded as unlawful.81 
Johnson notes that under the Court’s existing jurisprudence, it is 
imperative to read the residual clause in conjunction with the 
enumerated offenses. Ignoring those offenses would lead to an 
inclusion of additional predicate offenses too dissimilar to the 
enumerated offenses to justify their classification as violent felonies.82 
Johnson argues that the purpose of the ACCA was designed to 
create national uniformity with respect to sentence enhancement for 
violent criminals.83 As the Court has previously noted, the legislative 
intent behind the ACCA was to “supplement the States’ law 
enforcement efforts against ‘career’ criminals.”84 Within this 
overarching goal, Congress sought to focus only upon the most 
serious offenses and to ignore other, lesser offenses.85 
Next, Johnson argues that, under the various tests put forth in the 
residual clause jurisprudence, mere possession of a short-barreled 
shotgun cannot be a violent felony.86 Under the “similar in kind” test,87 
Johnson argues that such a possession offense is markedly different 
 
 79.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 16. 
 80.  Id. at 7. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. at 15 (quoting Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 141–42 (2008)). 
 83.  Id. at 11; cf. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 590 (1990) (stating that there is no 
“indication that Congress ever abandoned its general approach, in designating predicate 
offenses, of using uniform, categorical definitions to capture all offenses of a certain level of 
seriousness . . . regardless of technical definitions and labels under state law”). 
 84.  Taylor, 495 U.S. at 581. 
 85.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 12. According to Johnson, it makes sense that the 
legislative history does not suggest legislative intent to include mere possession of either 
explosives or firearms in the predicate offenses for purposes of sentence enhancement. See id. at 
13. 
 86.  Id. at 15. 
 87.  See Begay, 553 U.S. at 143. 
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from the enumerated offenses in that it is an offense merely of 
possession and requires no proof of additional elements.88 Possession 
is “passive,” unlike the enumerated offenses which “all involve active 
felonies.”89 A focus on the minimum conduct required for an offense 
necessitates that the appropriate comparative analysis is between the 
enumerated offenses and only the “basic passive elements of mere 
possession . . . and not some imagined use.”90 This is of particular 
salience in cases dealing with possession of a weapon, Johnson argues, 
because in many cases, the weapon is never exposed to another 
person.91 
Simply put, “mere possession of a weapon doesn’t have to involve 
any risk,” whereas those activities involving a weapon that “go 
beyond . . . mere possession” have a high level of risk.92 Furthermore, 
Johnson argues, possession of a short-barreled shotgun is widely legal 
under state law and is, subject to registration, allowed under federal 
law as well; in contrast, enumerated offenses are universally 
proscribed.93 In only a small minority of states, Johnson asserts, is 
possession of short-barreled shotguns prohibited outright.94 
As to whether a mere possession offense meets Begay’s 
“purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test, Johnson argues that 
“additional steps are required to convert simple possession into an act 
that uses violence.”95 Thus, in a case dealing with mere possession, the 
“purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test is not subsumed into the risk 
analysis.96 
Johnson further argues that the closest analog, among the 
enumerated offenses, to mere possession of a short-barreled shotgun 
is the use of explosives; although the former only entails passive 
possession, the latter “necessarily entails an active employment of a 
 
 88.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 19. As the Court held in Taylor, the focus of an 
ACCA analysis is on the “elements of the statute of conviction, not to the facts of each 
defendant’s conduct.” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601. 
 89.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 20, 22. 
 90.  Id. at 20. 
 91.  Id. at 21 (quoting United States v. Miller, 721 F.3d 435, 439 (7th Cir. 2013)). 
 92.  Miller, 721 F.3d at 440. 
 93.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 18, at 25–26 (noting that the National Firearms Act 
does not outright proscribe possession of short-barreled shotguns, though it does provide for 
strict regulation of such firearms).  
 94.  Id. at 28. 
 95.  Id. at 29. 
 96.  Id. at 30. 
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dangerous item.”97 The risk entailed with mere possession, Johnson 
argues, is relatively low because there is no requirement for use of the 
firearm, particularly given that, under the right circumstances, 
possession is lawful and available statistics do not show mere 
possession to be more risky.98 
B.  The Government’s Arguments 
The Government begins by arguing that this case is properly 
framed as dealing with illegal possession of a short-barreled shotgun, 
not mere possession more generally.99 Viewing the question in this 
manner, the Government argues, makes it clear that such possession 
constitutes a violent felony under the ACCA because it presents a 
heightened risk of serious physical injury to another person.100 A 
person who unlawfully possesses a short-barreled shotgun is one who 
is “likely to engage in serious, dangerous crimes with the weapon,”101 
and possession of such a weapon during the commission of a serious 
crime increases the risk of serious physical harm.102 
To buttress this argument, the Government argues that the 
ordinary case of possession of a short-barreled shotgun is in 
connection with the commission of serious crime,103 in part relying 
upon dicta in District of Columbia v. Heller,104 which implied that 
possession of a short-barreled shotgun is typically dissociated from 
law-abiding behavior. The Government notes that while all shotguns, 
regardless of the length of the barrel, can cause “catastrophic injury,” 
the particular danger inherent with a short-barrel shotgun is 
especially acute because such a weapon is easily concealed and 
“maneuver[able] in tight confines.”105 Shotguns with short or 
shortened barrels, the Government claims, are not designed for lawful 
uses such as self-defense or hunting or skeet shooting.106 Instead, 
 
 97.  Id. at 39. 
 98.  Id. at 37, 39. 
 99.  Brief for Respondent at 15, Johnson v. United States, No. 13-7120 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2014) 
[hereinafter Brief for Respondent]. 
 100.  Id. at 17. 
 101.  Id. at 18. 
 102.  Id. at 31. 
 103.  Id. at 18. 
 104.  554 U.S. 570, 625 (2008) (explicitly excluding short-barreled shotguns from those 
firearms “typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes”). 
 105.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 99, at 18–19. 
 106.  Id. at 20 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 624–25; United States v. Upton, 512 F.3d 394, 404 
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short-barreled shotguns are in the same “quasi-suspect” class as 
grenades or machineguns,107 because they are designed for 
“indiscriminate murder, maiming, and intimidation.”108 As such, the 
Government embraces the Eighth Circuit’s prior holdings that such 
weapons present an “inherent[] danger[] and lack usefulness except 
for violent and criminal purposes.”109 
To rebut Johnson’s claim that possession of a short-barreled 
shotgun is lawful in some circumstances and thus cannot be a violent 
felony,110 the Government contends that the ordinary state-law case of 
unlawful possession is highly unlikely to involve a possessor who 
abides with federal firearms regulations; therefore, for analysis of the 
ordinary case, lawful possession of short-barreled shotguns must be 
ignored.111 
The Government cites empirical evidence supporting the view 
that “short-barreled shotguns are primarily weapons of crime.”112 
Although admitting Johnson may be correct that, statistically, 
handguns are used in more crimes than short-barreled shotguns, the 
Government contends that the comparison is inapt principally 
because it has long been recognized that handguns have a lawful use, 
whereas short-barreled shotguns do not.113 In this respect, the 
Government emphasizes that cases of unlawful possession of short-
barreled shotguns indicate that the “typical offender . . . [is] a violent 
 
(7th Cir. 2008)). 
 107.  Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 611–12 (1994). 
 108.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 99, at 21 (also noting that a “substantial number” of 
the cases of lawful possession of short-barreled shotguns are due to use in law enforcement or 
military contexts). 
 109.  Id. at 20 (quoting United States v. Vincent, 575 F.3d 820, 825 (8th Cir. 2009) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). The Government also argues that other legislation, such as the 
National Firearms Act, demonstrates a longstanding view of Congres that short-barreled 
shotguns have no inherent lawful use for private citizens. Id. at 22. In particular, the 
Government notes that it was precisely this concern that underpinned the Minnesota statute 
prohibiting possession of a short-barreled shotgun under which Johnson was convicted. Id. at 24 
(quoting State v. Ellenberger, 543 N.W.2d 673, 676 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996)). 
 110.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 111.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 99, at 25. Relying upon the dicta of Heller, the 
Government concludes that it is incontrovertible that “short-barreled shotguns possessed 
unlawfully are typically possessed in connection with other unlawful activity.” Id. Further, as the 
Government sees it, the regulatory regime set up by Congress for allowing possession of 
registered short-barreled shotguns merely provides a way to minimize the risk of criminal use of 
a short-barreled shotgun rather than demonstrating that possession of short-barreled shotguns is 
not inherently dangerous. Id. at 28. 
 112.  Id. at 22.  
 113.  Id. at 29. 
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felon” who intends to use the weapon in a violent crime.114 
Compounding this with the fact that such firearms are extremely 
powerful, easily concealed, and easy to control, possession of short-
barreled shotguns dramatically increases the risk of physical injury to 
others.115 Short-barreled shotguns thus pose a “unique danger,” 
evidenced by their use in many of high-profile crimes of mass 
violence.116 
The Government argues that possession of a short-barreled 
shotgun presents risks similar in kind as those presented by the 
enumerated offenses of § 924(e) because such possession evinces “a 
lack of concern for the safety of others,”117 increases the danger of 
violence, and “conveys an implicit threat of violence.”118 These risks 
are apparent in the ordinary case of illegal possession, which, given 
James v. United States,119 confines the range of analysis for determining 
whether such conviction is a violent felony.120 
The Government also takes issue with the contention that a 
categorical approach to § 924(e) necessarily excludes possessory 
offenses from the ambit of violent felonies; the Government instead 
argues that the “principal thrust” of the residual clause analysis asks 
what additional conduct may occur simultaneous to the offense.121 
Thus, the Government rejects the contention that the “least of the 
acts” analysis applies to the residual clause.122 Further, the 
Government argues that possession of a short-barreled shotgun is 
similar in risk to the use of explosives because the former is 
inherently dangerous and because possession of explosives can be 
legal even though the use of them may not.123 
Finally, the Government notes that, under applicable Minnesota 
precedent, illegal possession of a short-barreled shotgun is not a strict 
liability offense.124 Rather, the Minnesota statute requires a defendant 
 
 114.  Id. at 31. 
 115.  Id. at 32–34.  
 116.  Id. at 34.  
 117.  Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2269 (2011). 
 118.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 99, at 39.  
 119.  550 U.S. 192 (2007). 
 120.  See id. at 39–40 (quoting James, 550 U.S. at 204). 
 121.  Id. at 43.  
 122.  See id. at 44 (citing James, 550 U.S. at 207–09, for the proposition that an inquiry into 
risk turns on the ordinary case of the commission of the offense). 
 123.  Id. at 47–48. 
 124.  See id. at 49–50 (explaining that the “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test only 
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to “knowingly possess[]” a weapon to be convicted;125 thus, there is no 
need, under Sykes v. United States, to determine whether or not mere 
possession includes purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.126 The 
Government concludes that one who engages in the act of arming 
oneself with a short-barreled shotgun is engaged in the same sort of 
dangerous behavior as one who commits one of the enumerated 
offenses.127 
IV.  ANALYSIS: DETERMINING THE PROPER SCOPE OF “VIOLENT 
FELONY” 
Central to the question of the scope of violent felony is the 
meaning of the term “conduct.”128 Statutory construction begins with 
application of the “ordinary meaning” canon: where statutory 
language is unambiguous, that language should be interpreted 
according to the words themselves unless such application leads to 
absurd results.129 The term “conduct” means the “action or manner of 
conducting, directing, managing, or carrying on (any business, 
performance, process, course, etc.); direction, management.”130 In 
contrast, “possession,” or the “exercise of dominion or control,”131 has 
been defined by the Supreme Court to include both actual possession 
and constructive possession.132 While a showing of actual possession 
 
applies to offenses which do not require a mens rea element). 
 125.  Id. at 50–51 (quoting State v. Salyers, 842 N.W.2d 28, 34–35 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014)). 
 126.  See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2275–76. 
 127.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 99, at 53–54. 
 128.  See 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (West 2014) (“‘violent felony’ means any crime 
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . [which] involves conduct that 
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another person” (emphasis added)). 
 129.  E.g., United States v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929). Two 
commentators refer to the ordinary-meaning rule as the “most fundamental semantic rule of 
interpretation.” ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARDNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 69 (2012). 
 130.  3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 690 (2d ed. 1989); cf. WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 274 (1988) (defining conduct as “the act, manner, or process of 
carrying on” or the “mode or standard of personal behavior”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 336 
(9th ed. 2009) (stating that conduct is “[p]ersonal behavior, whether by action or inaction; the 
manner in which a person behaves”). This meaning has persisted for a considerable time. See 1 
NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 44 (1828) (defining 
the term as “personal behavior; course of actions” and noting that, at the time, conduct, by 
itself, denoted the “idea of behavior or course of life or manners”). 
 131.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 130, at 1281. 
 132.  See Nat’l Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58, 67 (1914) (noting that “both in 
common speech and in legal terminology, there is no word more ambiguous in its meaning than 
possession” because the term “is interchangeably used to describe actual possession and 
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may necessitate proof of some sort of “directing, managing, or 
carrying on,” constructive possession, as a legal construct, requires no 
demonstration of conduct.133 This is particularly true for the 
Minnesota statute Johnson was convicted under: there was no 
requirement that actual, physical custody of the shotgun be 
demonstrated to convict.134 In fact, as the Eighth Circuit below noted, 
the factual record here is not distinguishable from that in United 
States v. Lillard, which dealt with a conviction under a Nebraska 
statute prohibiting constructive possession of a “short shotgun.”135 
Thus, under the ordinary meaning of the term, constructive 
possession would not fall within the scope of “conduct” because it 
does not entail any “action or manner of . . . directing, managing or 
carrying on.”136 The Court’s prior rulings on the residual clause in no 
way distract from the plain meaning of the clause because those cases 
dealt only with offenses involving conduct.137 
 
constructive possession which often so shade into one another that it is difficult to say where 
one ends and the other begins”). 
 133.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 130, at 1282 (defining constructive 
possession as “[c]ontrol or dominion over a property without actual possession or custody”); see 
also 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 45 (2006) (stating that constructive possession is knowledge of the 
object possessed along with an “ability to maintain control over it or reduce it to . . . physical 
possession”) (citation omitted); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 224 (2d 
ed. 2010) (stating that constructive possession is “often described in terms of dominion and 
control” or even more generally used to describe “circumstances in which the defendant had the 
ability to reduce an object to his control”); WILLIAM L. CLARK JR., HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL 
LAW 323–24 (William E. Mickell, ed., 3d ed. West Publishing Co. 1915) (differentiating actual 
from constructive possession). This is the definition courts have adopted for constructive 
possession in the context of criminal law. See, e.g., Aqua Log, Inc. v. Georgia, 594 F.3d 1330, 
1336–37 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 134.  See generally MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.67(2) (West 2014). 
 135.  United States v. Lillard, 685 F.3d 773, 776 n.3 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 136.  Interestingly enough, Johnson does not flesh out this plain meaning argument, though 
he does reference the “plain meaning of the term ‘violent felony.’” Brief for Petitioner, supra 
note 18, at 42. The plain meaning of the term “conduct” plays a central role in one of the amici 
arguments, however. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Gun Owners of America, Inc. et al. at 7–9, 
Johnson v. United States, No. 13-7120 (U.S. Jul. 3, 2014) (arguing that Johnson’s conviction was 
based upon constructive possession, not requiring showing of actual custody, and thus not based 
upon any proof of conduct on part of Johnson) [hereinafter Brief Amicus Curiae of Gun 
Owners of America]. The Government addressed this argument, arguing that the meaning of 
conduct must encompass both actual and constructive possession because “[p]ossession requires 
action to exercise dominion over an object, either actually or constructively, such as by 
exercising exclusive control over the area where the object is located.” Brief for Respondent, 
supra note 99, at 46 n.21 (citing State v. Denison, 607 N.W.2d 796, 799–800 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2000)). 
 137.  See Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011) (vehicular flight); Chambers v. 
United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009) (fleeing officer); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) 
(DUI); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 192 (2007) (attempted burglary). Because all of 
ROBE 3.5.2015 - FINAL READ VERSION (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2015 12:48 PM 
122 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 10 
 
Of course, statutory interpretation does not end with the plain 
meaning divorced from context; rather, in determining the meaning of 
statutory language, the Court must examine not only the particular 
language at issue but also the “language and design of the statute as a 
whole.”138 Tellingly, one of the enumerated offenses, the use of 
explosives, expressly limits its scope to use, not to possession.139 The 
fact that only use of explosives is included in the definition of violent 
felony forecloses the possibility that mere possession of explosives 
would also meet that definition.140 By extension, therefore, it would be 
illogical to view the statutory language of the residual clause as 
including as a violent felony constructive possession of a short-
barreled shotgun when, arguably, explosives are inherently more 
dangerous than a firearm. This is so because the latter normally 
requires some additional action to create a risk of physical harm while 
the former does not. 
Further, as one appellate court has reasoned, all of the 
enumerated offenses “manifest affirmative, overt and active conduct” 
with respect to the serious risk of potential physical harm they 
present to another “beyond the mere possession of a weapon.”141 The 
Court’s residual clause jurisprudence bears this point out. As the 
Court ruled in Begay v. United States, all four of the enumerated 
offenses “typically involve purposeful, ‘violent,’ and ‘aggressive’ 
conduct.”142 Therefore, the Court’s precedent supports the conclusion 
that, read contextually, the residual clause does not encompass 
offenses of mere possession because these offenses lack an element 
requiring an “act, manner, or process of carrying on.”143 
 
 
these cases dealt with conduct, the Court’s approach in Sykes, focusing on the risk analysis, does 
not do away with the statutory requirement that, for a predicate offense to constitute a violent 
felony under the ACCA, it must involve conduct.  
 138.  K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (citations omitted); cf. United 
Savings Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs, Ltd, 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) 
(“Statutory construction . . . is a holistic endeavor.”). This rule is sometimes referred to as the 
“whole-text” canon. 
 139.  See 18 U.S.C.A § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (West 2014). 
 140.  This is precisely the reasoning adopted by the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Flores, 
477 F.3d 431, 436 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 141.  United States v. Oliver, 20 F.3d 415, 418 (11th Cir. 1994). 
 142.  Begay, 553 U.S. at 144–45; see also Chambers, 555 U.S. at 128 (stating that a “crime 
amount[ing] to a form of inaction [is] a far cry from the “purposeful, ‘violent,’ and ‘aggressive’ 
conduct potentially at issue” with respect to the enumerated offenses) (citation omitted).  
 143.  WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 274 (1988). 
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This construction of the statute is reinforced by application of the 
rule against superfluous construction, a canon holding that “a statute 
should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions” 
rendering “no part [to] be inoperative or superfluous.”144 Application 
of this canon suggests that mere possession could not be within the 
confines of § 924(e). A contrary reading would render the term “use” 
superfluous in the phrase “use of explosives,” one of the enumerated 
offenses.145 The fact that the residual clause hinges on the phrase 
“involves conduct,” by negative implication, would foreclose offenses 
not based on conduct from falling within the purview of the residual 
clause. Furthermore, the Government all but concedes that the 
residual clause cannot encompass mere possession offenses when it 
acknowledges that “the elements required to complete the offense of 
possession of a short-barreled shotgun do not necessitate a risk of 
physical injury.”146 
In terms of the risk analysis performed under the residual clause, 
comparison should be made between the offense at issue and its 
closest analog among the enumerated offenses.147 While the use of 
explosives is undeniably risky, the mere possession of a short-barreled 
shotgun is “not in the same league.”148 Though statistics can be useful 
in informing the Court’s analysis of the residual clause, they are by no 
 
 144.  Clark v. Rameker, 134 S. Ct. 2242, 2248 (2014) (quoting Corley v. United States, 556 
U.S. 303, 314 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Some refer to this rule of statutory 
construction as the “surplusage canon.” See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 129, at 174 (stating 
“[i]f possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect”). 
 145.  Such reasoning follows the Court’s analysis of neighboring provisions of the ACCA, in 
which the Court construed “use” of a firearm as “requir[ing] evidence sufficient to show an 
active employment of the firearm” and that, therefore, the term “must connote more than mere 
possession.” Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 143 (1995), superseded by statute, An Act to 
throttle criminal use of guns, Pub. L. 105–386, 112 Stat. 3469, as recognized in Abbott v. United 
States, 562 U.S. 8 (2010). The fact that Congress responded to Bailey by amending 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 924(c) to include mere possession is proof Congress understands that if it intends to regulate 
the possession of firearms under the ACCA, it must incorporate explicit language to that effect. 
Because Congress included possession of a firearm in § 924(c) but continues not to do so in § 
924(e) is further evidence that § 924(e) does not cover possession offenses. 
 146.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 99, at 43. 
 147.  E.g., Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2273 (2011) (comparing vehicular flight to 
the enumerated offense of burglary because both crimes may lead to violent confrontation). 
 148.  United States v. Miller, 721 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 2013). As amici Gun Owners et al. 
perceptively, yet drolly, point out, “[a] short-barreled shotgun sitting in the corner is not 
inherently more dangerous than a short-barreled shotgun sitting in the corner with an ATF tax 
stamp lying next to it.” Brief Amicus Curiae of Gun Owners of America, supra note 136, at 15 
n.8. 
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means “dispositive.”149 Given the fundamental difference between 
“use” and “mere possession,” it follows that “possess[ion of] one type 
of [National Firearms Act] outlawed weapon” cannot constitute a 
violent felony.150 
If the Court is concerned about construing the residual clause too 
narrowly, it should restrict its holding to constructive possession and 
leave for another day a decision on whether certain cases of actual 
possession fall within the scope of conduct offenses which satisfy the 
requirements of the residual clause. This holding would be consistent 
with the prior Supreme Court decisions requiring the scope of the 
residual clause to be informed by the enumerated offenses, all of 
which the Court has characterized as “conduct,” an element lacking 
from the concept of constructive possession.151 Because this 
interpretation derives from the correct construction of the statutory 
text, the Court ought to hold that an offense requiring nothing more 
than constructive possession does not constitute a violent felony 
under the residual clause of the ACCA. 
Finally, a holding focused upon the plain meaning of the statutory 
language would allow the Court to resolve the case in such a way as to 
avoid the constitutional question of whether the ACCA is 
impermissibly vague.152 Interpreting the ACCA in light of the plain 
meaning of the term “conduct” would not result in an indefinite 
criminal prohibition because courts would only engage in complex, 
comparative risk analysis under the ACCA only if the predicate 
offense first involved conduct. Any non-conduct based offenses would 
necessarily be excluded as predicate offenses under the § 924(e) 
residual clause. 
 
 149.  Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2274. 
 150.  United States v. McGill, 618 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 151.  See Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 127–28 (2009) (declaring that inaction 
does not amount to “conduct,” because it lacks “as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person of another” (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (West 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
 152.  Under the rule of constitutional avoidance, in its modern form, a court must not 
resolve a case on constitutional grounds if it can decide the case as a matter of statutory 
construction. E.g., Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343 
(1999) (quoting Spector Motor Serv. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944)). The Court has 
described the operation of this rule as “a tool for choosing between competing plausible 
interpretations of a statutory text, resting on the reasonable presumption that Congress did not 
intend the alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts.” Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 
371, 381 (2005) (citations omitted). 
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Engaging in this saving construction would serve both ends of the 
void-for-vagueness doctrine. It would provide the public with actual 
notice that only those offenses involving conduct fall within the 
purview of the statute and prevent arbitrary enforcement as police, 
prosecutors, and juries would otherwise continue to struggle with 
determining which non-conduct offenses count under the ACCA, 
potentially making such determinations based merely upon “their 
[own] personal predilections.”153 Further, an avoidance of the 
constitutional question would allow the Court to keep its existing § 
924(e) residual clause jurisprudence intact precisely because all of the 
Court’s prior decisions are consistent with the plain meaning of the 
term conduct.154 On the other hand, a holding that the ACCA is 
unconstitutionally vague would necessitate the Court over-ruling all 
of its prior § 924(e) residual clause jurisprudence. 
CONCLUSION 
Parsing an ambiguous statutory provision can be difficult and 
requires the Court to tread delicately. However, a careful textual 
analysis indicates that the correct answer to the question of whether 
mere possession of a short-barreled shotgun is a violent felony under 
the ACCA is not an insurmountable challenge under the Court’s 
residual clause jurisprudence. Indeed, both the ordinary meaning of 
the term “conduct” and the context surrounding the residual clause 
indicate that possession offenses and, in particular, constructive 
possession offenses, fall outside of the scope of that clause. Because 
existing residual clause jurisprudence has focused upon deciding 
which conduct offenses fall within the reach of § 924(e)—by 
implication mere possession offenses are outside the scope of the 
residual clause. Put differently, a holding that mere possession 
offenses are not covered by the residual clause is not only consistent 
with prior cases but is actually favored by precedent. Such a holding 
 
 153.  Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974). 
 154.  See supra note 137 and accompanying text. This appears to be the approach Justice 
Scalia has long advocated, though without success in securing a majority on the Court. For 
instance, he has declared his preference for an approach to the residual clause which “figure[s] 
out a coherent way of interpreting the statute so that it applies in a relatively predictable and 
administrable fashion” as including a relatively small subset of crimes rather than strike down 
the law on vagueness grounds. James v. United States, 550 US. 197, 230 (2007) (Scalia, J. 
dissenting). Justice Scalia reaffirmed his position four years later. See Sykes v. United States, 
131 S. Ct. 2267, 2287 (2011) (Scalia, J. dissenting).  
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would allow the Court to follow the rule of constitutional avoidance 
and resolve the case based solely upon matters of statutory 
interpretation without reaching any constitutional question. 
 
